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ABSTRACT

This essay seeks to draw out the connections between perceptual conversions of
reality within the work of Kenneth Burke and the film Inception (Christopher Nolan
2010). By establishing the degree to which Inception portrays an impossible pursuit of
objective reality, one can better understand how dramatism implicitly instigates a similar
pursuit of a mythic reality separate from any kind of orientational contingency. As way of
reacting to this misconception of dramatism made apparent through the metaphor
provided by the film, I want to foreground the concept of “delayed action” as the
fundamental basis of Burke’s formulation of dramatism in A Grammar of Motives. By
directing attention to Burke’s dependence upon literary representations for his definition
of this concept, I reveal the ways in which dramatism is better defined as a critical
attitude, or an act of delay.
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DELAYED ACTION OR LOCOMOTION? CON/VERSIONS OF REALITY IN
DRAMATISM AND INCEPTION
Much of dramatism’s allure is in the way that it offers specific methods designed
to expose the symbolically constructed contingencies of one’s orientation which, as
Kenneth Burke defines them, are “a bundle of judgments as to how things were, how they
are, and how they may be” (Permanence and Change 14). The most compelling analysis
of Burke’s focus on the disruption of orientations comes from Bryan Crable’s article
“Distance as Ultimate Motive: A Dialectical Interpretation of A Rhetoric of Motives.” For
Crable, Burkean dialectic is tied to Burke’s idea of “pure persuasion,” which Crable
defines as “an appeal whose explanation lies not in its end, but in its own perpetuation”
(230). For this reason, Crable regards pure persuasion as a “mythic image” that is
necessary for dialectic because it inhibits stagnation in any one orientation due to its
inherently unattainable (mythic) quality that perpetuates one’s pursuit of it. To safeguard
against misconceptions of Burke as offering a means for arriving at this mythic realm
beyond orientation, I want to show how a fully formed conception of Burke’s use of the
mythic can be seen in his formulation of dramatism in A Grammar of Motives by
directing attention to the theoretical ties between dramatism as the adoption of a critical
“attitude” and the ways in which this attitude manifests for Burke as a “delayed action.”
For this reason, I want to propose the term con/version as descriptor for the
orientation provided through dramatism. By emphasizing the delay that prevents the
completion of an incipient act, I hope to expose the degree to which dramatism resides in
the suspended movement between two perceptions of reality. Describing the disruptive
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act of dramatism as a con/version helps us to think about dramatism not as a movement
towards an arrival at the mythic but as a movement away from a singular orientation.
There is still a version of reality that is maintained, it is simply separated from the
perpetual movement denoted by the term in its complete form (conversion). The prefix
can now act less as a proscription for constant movement and more of a reminder of the
inevitable contingencies of symbolicity that are present in any version of reality. In
addition, if dramatism implicitly reinforces the moment of conversion as a way of
moving towards a non-contingent perception of reality, then we must foreground the
degree to which this moment is inevitably yet another con/version (false version) of
reality.
A mythic pursuit outside of an orientation is portrayed in an even more explicit
manner within the film Inception (Christopher Nolan 2010). Reading Burke alongside the
metaphor of this film serves to expose the tension between conscious and unconscious
instigations of reorientation (transfers between alternate perceptions of reality) through
the film’s representation of the inevitability of foundationalism and relativism elicited by
the disruption of one’s orientation in pursuit of an objective (conscious) reality.
For the most part, my analysis revolves around Dom Cobb (played by Leonard
DiCaprio) and his inception of his wife Mal (played by Marion Cotillard). After spending
years (in dream time) together deep within Mal’s subconscious, Mal comes to accept her
dream world as reality. Fearing the consequences of an eternal dream limbo, Cobb
convinces Mal that she is living in a dream by altering her “totem,” a small, familiar
trinket specific to each character that allows one to maintain the distinction between
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dream and reality. When Cobb reveals to Mal that her totem is defying its realistic
physical properties, she is forced to acknowledge her reality as a dream and thus agrees to
commit suicide by laying in front of a train in order to wake up and return to conscious
reality. Once awake, Mal is so plagued with uncertainty about the verity of her world that
she eventually commits suicide in order to escape what she believes to be a construction
of her subconscious. My analysis will reveal how Mal’s pursuit of conscious reality
dictates the film’s relativist ending because of its misdirected attention on the mythic
image of objective reality as opposed to the incipient space (attitude) enacted through this
pursuit.
In relation to my use of Inception, I want to focus on the ways in which the film
represents the impossibility of a third reaction between foundationalism and relativism
due to its dependence on the invasive (unconscious) instigation of this third space
between two realities. In its misrepresentation, the film renders dramatism’s delayed act
of disrupting one’s orientation (perception of reality) into an act of sheer motion
(relativism) through the symbol of the barreling train that Cobb and Mal use to instigate
an arrival at a conscious perception reality. The problem with Inception’s representation
of altering perceptions of reality is that it misconstrues the degree to which motion is a
necessary factor in reorientation. Indeed, the very image of locomotion that the film
employs as a symbol for altering perceptions of reality reflects the perpetual movement
amongst alternate locations that characterizes Mal’s pursuit of an objective reality.
However, the film’s misrepresentation of unconscious motivations (inception) for
reorientation is also useful in the sense that it foregrounds the necessity of “delayed
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action” in reorienting one’s perspective. Dramatism is a conscious act; however, it is a
conscious act that is deprived of a certain degree of terminal awareness due to the
uncertainty that is necessary for instigating a liminal space between two perceptions of
reality. Through this, I hope to reinforce a conception of Burke’s dramatism as the
instigation of an act of delay. Contrary to the unconscious process of inception that is
foregrounded within the film, a reorientation of perception must start at the level of a
conscious dismantling of one’s current reality in order to confuse adherence to it.
Through this con/fusion, the dramatistic subject is simultaneously separated from their
current reality and drawn towards but not quite connected to, a new, illusory one.
The critical movement encouraged by dramatism is in need of further exploration.
In the same way that Inception’s myth of an objective reality moves the characters on a
path of perpetual conversion amongst different perceptions of reality, Burke’s disruptive
movement implicitly encourages a move towards a perception of reality that is beyond
orientation. It is for this reason that the delayed aspect of dramatism’s disruptive act
needs to be brought to the fore Burkean scholarship.

Inception and Dramatism: The Basics
Kenneth Burke writes in Permanence and Change:
A Babel of new orientations has arisen in increasing profusion during the last
century, until now hardly a year goes by without some brand new model of the
universe being offered us …The only thing that all this seems to make for is a
reinforcement of the interpretative attitude itself (117-8).
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In this rhetorical call to arms, Burke highlights a fundamental aspect of his theory of
rhetoric and language which he would later coalesce under the term dramatism: one’s
perception of “the universe” is not of an objective reality but is in many ways simply one
“model” amongst many others. Thus, due to the symbolic influence of our perception of
reality, Burke argues for the privileging of an “interpretive attitude” that forces the
exposure of its symbolic contingencies. In his now ubiquitous essay “Terministic
Screens,” Burke describes a fundamental relationship between language (our “terms”)
and perception when he writes “much that we take as observations about ‘reality’ may be
but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of terms” (Language
as Symbolic Action, 46).
Burke’s vast corpus contains many calls for the instilling of an appropriate
attitude of critical response to our situation as “symbol using animals” (LAS, 3).
However, I believe that Burke most effectively characterizes this attitude at the end of his
contribution to Modern Philosophies and Education when he summarizes the
implications of the various pedagogical methods he proposes therein. He writes that “the
ultimate value in such verbal exercising would be its contribution towards the suffering
of an attitude that pointed towards a distrustful admiration of all symbolism” (“Linguistic
Approaches,” 287). In his use of the oppositional phrase “distrustful admiration” to
characterize the sort of “attitude” he hopes to inspire, Burke places emphasis on the
inherent uncertainty that arises through one’s use of his methodologies. Near the end of
this article, Burke alludes to the idea that this attitude can be conceived of as a mystical
“ultimate reality that stretches beyond the fogs of language” (300). Through these
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somewhat enigmatic descriptions of dramatism, Burke reinforces the idea that dramatism
(to return to his metaphor from Permanence and Change) affords us the opportunity to
witness the dismantling of our “models” of reality. Dramatism seeks a third route in
between the belligerent acceptance of one’s current orientation (foundationalism) and the
utter rejection of any orientation (relativism). As I will argue through the film Inception,
it is in the paradoxical tension between a deteriorating reality and the advancement of a
mythic “ultimate reality” from which the misconception concerning dramatism’s ability
to move outside orientation arises.
For the most part, Inception is faithful to the elements of a typical Hollywood
heist film. A band of disparate criminals embark upon a bafflingly complex, do-or-die
mission in the hopes of landing a major hit on a morally corrupt, corporate antagonist. In
addition, the protagonist’s attention to the heist is consistently diverted by a personal,
parallel story line that runs throughout the main action of the film which, in Inception,
manifests through Cobb’s recurring projection of his deceased wife Mal. Although I will
be focusing primarily on the latter of the two major storylines, I will outline a brief
synopsis of both in order to provide a complete conception of the film’s overall structure
and various character motivations.
Dom Cobb is the leader of an illegal band of subconscious infiltrators whose
specialty is entering an individual’s dream space to surreptitiously extract pertinent
information. Early in the film, Cobb is hired by Saito (played by Ken Watanabe), a
wealthy energy magnate, to infiltrate the mind of Robert Fischer (played by Cillian
Murphy), the heir to a powerful energy conglomerate; however, Saito does not want
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Cobb to extract an idea but to “incept” one. Through this inception, Saito hopes to
motivate Fischer to the conscious act of liquidating his father’s energy monopoly.
Confident, yet reluctant, in his ability to accomplish the job, Cobb agrees to the terms on
the condition that Saito will help clear his criminal record and reunite him with his
children. Then, through an elaborate series of subconscious maneuvers, Cobb and his
team enter Fischer’s dream space three levels deep (a dream within a dream within a
dream) and implant the idea.
As they carry out the inception of Robert Fischer, the team utilizes various
techniques of deception, some of which could be found in any ancient sophist’s rhetorical
tool kit. For example, when the team is discussing the possibility of inception, they begin
with the assumption that the incepted idea must appear to arise naturally from the mind of
the target (the one being incepted). Burke even refers to this concept of audience
identification in A Rhetoric of Motives when he writes how in such cases of persuasion
the audience “feels as though it were not merely receiving, but were itself creatively
participating in the poet’s or speaker’s assertion” (58).
The film’s representation of the process of inception allows for an opportunity to
elaborate on the distinctions between Burke’s conception of dramatism (and the pentad
specifically) as a persuasive device and as an analytical method. According to Burke,
dramatism, in its most basic sense, is a method for analyzing human motivations through
five distinct terms: Scene, Act, Agency, Agent, and Purpose. Through these terms, Burke
argues, one can reconsider “what is involved when we say what people are doing and
why they are doing it” (xv). The process of inception within the film inverts Burke’s
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conception of dramatism in the way that it manipulates the pentadic terms as a way of
persuading a “target” through the instilling of a specific “attitude.”
In this scenario, the four terms Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose are all
motivationally privileged as utilities for prompting a specific action, which is defined by
Burke as “the human body in conscious or purposive motion” (14). Cobb and his team
appear seemingly unique in their ability to manipulate these four terms within the mind of
Robert Fischer in the aim of creating a set of motivations that will elicit his “purposive”
act of dismantling his father’s energy conglomerate. Thus, the team can control
motivational elements that one typically considers uncontrollable, hence the elaborate
and complex process of inception that the film portrays.
However, this process of inception is not much different from the way in which
Burke argues one is realistically moved to action. In A Grammar of Motives, Burke
defines attitude as “an incipient or delayed action” in which the “potentiality” of a
specific act is motivationally plausible but not yet actualized. Furthermore, Burke argues
that the “inception” of a specific attitude (incipient act) is as ubiquitous as the “rhetoric of
advertisers and propagandists who would induce action in behalf of their commodities or
their causes by the formation of appropriate attitudes” (236). Burke even foregrounds his
preliminary description of dramatism by referencing the scenic construction of
communistic colonies in New England that were intentionally designed to foster certain
types of acts: “the colonists were to arrange a social situation of such a sort that virtuous
acts would be the logical and spontaneous result of conditions” (14). In this way, the
contrived parameters of a scene are privileged as primary factors in creating the set of
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motivations necessary for the realization of a certain kind of act. Throughout his work,
Burke is focused on exposing the ways in which one’s induced attitudes, and
consequently one’s orientations, are derived from the influence of these outside forces
and thus make necessary the kind of interpretative framework he proposes through his
theory of dramatism and, in the beginning of GM, the pentad.
Much like this limited conception of the pentad, Inception privileges the
coordination of these four pentadic elements (scene, agent, agency, purpose) to
implicitly, or subconsciously, construct an attitude through which a particular act (the
fifth term) will materialize. This can be seen in the film’s attention to the complex
wrangling that takes place within Fischer’s subconscious to establish the requisite
motivations for his actions in conscious reality. Thus, much like Burke goes on to predict
in his discussion of the term, the potential for the term Act to be seen as the sole
originator of motive is neglected in favor of its ability to merely actualize the implicit
motivations of the other four terms.
In the section “Act as Locus of Motives,” Burke predicts a propensity to “slight
the term act, in the very featuring of it…We see this temptation in the search for an act’s
motives, which one spontaneously thinks of locating under the heading of scene, agent,
agency, or purpose, but hardly under the heading of act” (GM, 65). In noting one’s
natural tendency to neglect the motivational possibilities provided by this pentadic term,
Burke highlights the problematic conception of reality that he strives to make apparent
through his disruptive theory of dramatism. In this scenario, an act is relevant only to the
extent that it is the “location” (locus) at which the other four motivational terms of the
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pentad converge and make “explicit the implicit” motivations that were rhetorically
constructed by the parameters of a particular situation (7). The incipient act
(unconscious) instilled by the four terms is realized in the (conscious) act.
However, in privileging the motivational priority of the four terms Scene,
Agency, Agent, and Purpose one simultaneously illuminates their innate illusory quality.
Equating each of his five terms with the major philosophical trends of his time, Burke
aligns Act with “realism,” thus explicitly relegating the other four terms to a more elusive
status (128). Likewise, as early as Permanence and Change, Burke outlines how the
attitude-inducing manipulations of these four terms are masked by the symbolic
construction that is made real in the act. He writes, “In periods of firmly established
meanings, one does not study them [symbols], one uses them” (162). In keeping with the
pentadic metaphor provided by Inception, these four terms are only real in the degree to
which they are made real (conscious) in the locus of the act and, without their
manifestation in this form, are merely the illusory characteristics of a dream.
Inception represents Burke’s idea of act as the exclusive locus of motive through
its portrayal of the conversion between alternate realities through death. In Inception,
death is conceived primarily as a device for returning to reality. Characters can only be
certain that they are not dreaming if they die and presumably wake up to a conscious
reality. However, evident from the first scene of the film, they cannot be any more certain
that the alternate reality obtained through death is any more “real” than the previous one.
Although there are moments throughout the film that discuss this fundamental rule of
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dream-hacking, the idea is presented most clearly in one of the final scenes in which
Cobb reveals his inception of Mal.
After her inception, Mal enacts Burke’s act--as--exclusive--locus--of--motive in
the way that her motives for terminating her current reality did not arise out of a
conscious recognition of the symbolically constructed nature of her orientation. As she
and Cobb walk to the train, her reality remains intact, revealing her lack of genuine belief
in the need for the encroaching reorientation instigated by the approaching train. It is in
this way that Mal’s forced reorientation is less the conscious action of dramatism and
more the unconscious locomotion of inception. The locomotion of inception provides
nothing other than sheer movement to an alternate version of reality (conversion) as
opposed to the conscious reflection of the current reality (con/version). Where dramatism
promotes delay (incipient act, attitude), inception promotes arrival (complete acts).

The Divergent Responses to Dramatism
In Language as Symbolic Action, Burke outlines two reactionary perspectives on
reality with which his theories continually wrangle. In Burke’s estimation, the most
typical reaction is “a kind of naïve verbal realism,” or foundationalism, that is due to
either fear or denial of the symbolic contingency of one’s orientation (LAS, 5).
Conversely, Burke notes that one’s discovery of symbolic influence could also lead to an
endless denial of all orientations, or a kind of “mere relativism” (LAS, 52). Although
Burke alludes to the former reaction (foundationalism) in Counter-Statement when he
argues, rather succinctly, that a prolonged period of doubt often leads to a “hysterical
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retreat into belief,” he presents a more fully formed articulation of the idea in Language
as Symbolic Action. In this passage, Burke describes the extreme and almost unconscious
resistance that occurs when we are confronted with the symbolic contingencies of our
perception of reality: “Can we bring ourselves to realize…just how overwhelmingly
much of what we mean by ‘reality’ has been built up for us through nothing but our
symbol systems?” (5). Burke continues by citing that this moment is much like “peering
over the edge of things into an ultimate abyss” and coming to the realization that our
perception of things such as social events, political processes, and even scientific “facts”
all pass through the screen of language and thus affect the way in which we come to
understand them.
Burke also observes that the fear that comes from one’s realization that reality is,
to a certain extent, a construction is but “one reason why” an individual adheres to their
preconceived perceptions. Another reason, which Burke posited early in PC, is the
inevitable symbolicity that inheres in any orientation, even in one’s attempt to criticize it
when he writes that “one must leave some parts of it intact in order to have a point of
reference for his criticism” (PC, 169). Although one’s “model of the universe”
(orientation) must begin to fall apart in order for it to be recognized as a constructed
model in the first place, it cannot be completely dismantled in the process.
However, Burke’s claim that orientations are inevitable does not lead him to the
conclusion that we should not be critical of them. Rather, Burke seems to argue that
because orientations are inevitable the only way to deconstruct one orientation is to usher
in a new one. Burke foregrounds his description of reorientation with an emphasis on the
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movement which makes this shift possible: “for all the self-perpetuating qualities of an
orientation, it contains the germs of its dissolution…The ultimate result is the need of a
reorientation, a direct attempt to force the critical structure by shifts of perspective” (PC,
169). Although Burke is not interested in merely replacing one model of reality with
another, he recognizes the necessity of the act of re-placement, or re-orientation, in
forcing one’s current “model of the universe” to crumble. However, much like Bryan
Crable argues that “Burke’s emphasis upon the symbolic does not lead him to an extreme
social constructionist or perspectivist position,” we should keep in mind that Burke is just
as interested in avoiding a response that attempts to escape from orientations altogether
(relativism) (Crable, 310).
In “Terministic Screens,” Burke describes the relativist reaction to the symbolic
construction of reality, which he sums up in the heading to section V as “mere relativism”
(52). Here, Burke emphasizes the sense of “resignation” inherent to this type of reaction,
but it is not a resignation to one’s current orientation but rather to the endless movement
away from any kind of orientation, a perpetual “termination” of one’s current reality. He
writes, “Must we merely resign ourselves to an endless catalogue of terministic screens,
each of which can be valued for the light it throws upon the human animal, yet none of
which can be considered central?” (52). Although Burke makes clear in this section that
he is not calling for a sweeping rejection of all perceptions of reality (the full title of
section V is “Our Attempt to Avoid Mere Relativism”), he is also clearly drawing
attention to the necessity of this kind of reaction in order to develop a comprehensive
understanding of dramatism’s effectiveness in altering orientations.
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Abram Ander’s discusses this concept of a kind of maintained movement when he
foregrounds the idea of separation as a key underpinning of dramatism. In his analysis of
the pragmatic aspects of Burke’s claims about the potential of literature and art for
instigating alternate orientations, Anders argues that the critical shifting of dramatism
originates from a desire to seek an external perspective on one’s orientation. He writes,
“If we experience reality through the categories of our orientations, then any attempt to
resolve the ‘problems’ produced by these situations are necessarily attempts to think and
explicate their ‘outside.’ That is, the orientation itself is the problem to be encompassed”
(Anders). In Anders’ estimation, Burke’s attention to the possibility of moving outside of
an orientation is provided through “poetry and literature.” Ander’s attention to the mythic
qualities elicited through Burke’s use of literature similarly works to reinforce the
necessity of an ambiguous, almost mythic conception of a place beyond orientation,
pursuit of an “outside,” or, an “ultimate reality” similar to the kind that he discusses in
Modern Philosophies and Education.
Bryan Crable posits a similar conception of a sort of maintained movement when
he writes that Burke’s rhetorical motive inheres in the “creation of distance” (236). He
claims that Burke’s notion of the “rhetorical motive” is “the drive to transcend the
nonverbal, to create distance between oneself and one’s world” (236). Likewise, by
drawing out Burke’s dependence on this movement, Crable proposes a fundamental
conception of Burke’s thought as the instigation of distance perpetuated by the pursuit of
an unattainable “mythic image.” Crable defines “pure persuasion” as “an appeal whose
explanation lies not in its end, but in its own perpetuation” (230). The perpetual and non-
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empirical characteristics of pure persuasion create what Crable refers to as the “mythic
image” of Burke’s transcendent dialectic: “Understood as a mythic image, pure
persuasion transcends the particularity of empirical (positive) imagery. As a formal
condition, it lies beneath our acts, yet ‘exists nowhere’-indicating the archetypal or
ancestral elements eternally funding rhetorical appeals” (231).
The mythic image is that which instigates the pursuit of critical reflection by
virtue of its potential existence. The tendency to conceive of dramatism as a purveyor of
objective reality is the incepted myth of dramatism. It is analogous to Cobb’s inception of
Mal in the way that it acts as a catalyst of movement away from a current orientation
even though it does not exist in a verifiable form. The mythic image of Burke’s
dramatism is in the implicit tendency to conceive of its methods as not only offering
enough distance from a current orientation but all orientations and thus eventually
arriving outside of any orientational contingency.
Bridging off of Crable’s idea of the implicit “mythic image” of Burke’s
transcendent dialectic in A Rhetoric of Motives, I want to bring attention to the ways in
which this mythic image of Burke’s rhetoric is evident in his formulation of dramatism in
A Grammar of Motives. Through this I hope to expose the mythic qualities that “lie”
beneath an analytical conception of the pentad yet at the same time “exist nowhere.”
Inception helps to explore the implications of Crable’s claim of the possibility that the
disruptive impetus behind dramatism is the initiation of an act that has non-existent, or
“mythic,” motives.
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Within Inception, there is a similar pursuit of the mythic image of objective
reality initiated by Cobb’s suicidal-inducing inception of Mal. This moment in Inception
reinforces the extreme degree to which the actualization of an incipient act must be held
in abeyance to prevent this perpetuation of distance from ceasing. Inception works to
foreground the degree to which Burke’s dramatism can be seen not only as the pursuit of
a mythic perception of reality initiated and maintained by delayed action but as the
pursuit of a mythic reality initiated (and thus not maintained) through sheer locomotion.
By intentionally vacillating between alternate orientations, Burke instigates the
necessary tension between the foundationalism (“naïve verbal realism”) and (“mere”)
relativism required to elicit a dramatistic perspective which seeks to avoid a permanent
position in either one. As a result of his emphasis on the provocation of two simultaneous
orientations, Burke establishes a link between dramatism’s dependence upon
indeterminacy as well as the paradoxical simultaneity of motion/stasis. The way in which
the film represents the ability to arrive at an objective reality through death helps to
conceptualize Burke’s emphasis on the necessity of the delayed “execution” of the act of
conversion.

Inception’s Locomotion
Continuing his description of dramatism in GM, Burke makes clear that the
pentad is not simply a device to be used for highlighting the myriad ways in which one
can construct the four parameters of Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose in the aim of
prompting a specific Act. Rather, he argues, one must establish a sense of parity amongst

16

the various term-inistic loci in order to recognize that “a fully-rounded vocabulary of
motives will locate motives under all five aspects of our pentad” (65). In this description,
Burke is referring to his earlier discussion of pentadic ratios in which various terms (such
as Scene: Agent or Agent: Agency) are isolated in order to comprehend the influence that
a particular term may have had in influencing another. Through this lens, the pentad is
more like what Clark Rountree describes as “a universal heuristic of motives” (Rountree).
Stemming from this idea of the pentad as a heuristic device that allows one to
locate an act’s motive under any combination of the five terms, it follows for Burke that
motivation could just as easily be located within the act itself. Although Burke notes the
motivational possibility of Act when he writes that “any act could be treated as part of the
context that modifies (hence, to a degree motivates) the subsequent acts,” he later brings
up the idea of the Act as motivation in a more exclusive sense (GM, 7). He writes,
“However confusing the subject may become…it is at least obvious enough on this first
level: That among the resources of the pentad is the invitation to locate motives of an act
under the head of Act” (69). An act that is the motivation for itself would be deprived of
Scene, Agent, Agency, and Purpose in the sense that their involvement is now even more
detached from reality because the act is a self-contained motivation no longer contingent
on the parameters set up by the other four terms. Thus, Burke is then able to consider the
ways in which act can be a “locus of motives” not merely in the sense of a location where
the other terms can materialize but also as a motivational source in itself, imbued with “a
newness not already present in elements classifiable under any of the other four
headings” (GM, 65).
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The Act’s “invitation” to function as the nexus of motivation undergirds
dramatism’s disruption of perception. One’s orientation is not traceable to a distinct
substance and thus can only constantly reveal itself as a sub-stance through action.
Through this action, the disruptive aim of dramatism is revealed as the desire to shift
one’s present perception of reality to an alternate perception of reality that exposes the
positioning (sub-stance) inherent to any perception. Building off of Locke’s original
discussion of the inherent deflections provided by the term “substance,” Burke writes:

[T]he word ‘substance,’ used to designate what a thing is, derives from a word
designating something that a thing is not…the word in its etymological origins
would refer to an attribute of the thing’s context…And a thing’s context, being
outside or beyond the thing, would be something that the thing is not” (GM, 23).

Dramatism reveals an orientation’s sub-stance (illusory foundation) through the act of
disruption. This disruption of one’s perception of reality is inseparable from Burke’s
theory of dramatism in the way that it emphasizes the constant sub-version (or
con/version) of one’s present-version of reality. Indeed, in relation to Cobb and Mal’s
return to conscious “reality,” the way in which this disruption is made possible through
an immanent alternate reality (orientation) privileges the degree to which this perpetual
dramatistic distance is contingent on the conversion of one’s orientation. Although
Inception is misleading in its representation of this moment, when a conversion in
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orientation takes place we are necessarily presented with the conversion (falsity) of our
current orientation.
The motif of the barreling train that Cobb and Mal use to extricate themselves
from the illusory dream world they had built within the depths of Mal’s subconscious
reinforces a misconception of the kind of sheer motion that dramatism seeks to avoid in
its disruption of reality. The motion embodied in the imagery of the moving train is
exemplified through Mal’s seemingly deranged refrain of the train’s (death’s) ability to
bring her back to reality:

Mal: You're waiting for a train, a train that will take you far away. You know
where you hope this train will take you, but you don't know for sure. But it doesn't
matter.

Due to the way in which this incepted myth originated in Mal’s unconscious, her
impossible pursuit of an objective reality results not in the kind of delayed action of
dramatism but a locomotion, or a perpetual (relativist) movement from place to place in
which one’s destination not only “doesn’t matter” but is perpetually sought. Mal’s
reorientation was instigated through a chaotic (“loco”) motion as opposed to a conscious
delay of action warranted through a realization of the contingent nature of her reality.
Cobb’s inception of Mal, although misleading in its misrepresentation of the kind
of con/version instigated by dramatism, is useful in revealing the lines between insanity
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and uncertainty that Cobb alludes to in his use of the phrase “it doesn’t matter.” Although
dramatism may require a similar kind of incepted “mythic image” of pure persuasion that
Crable calls for as a necessary precondition for the creation of distance between alternate
orientations, the creation of this distance must not be bought at the price of a loss of
consciousness. In considering Mal’s forced encounter with this moment of conversion,
one will have recourse to consider how, for Burke, that although dramatistic disruption
initiates a movement towards an unknown destination, it is only valuable insofar as there
is conscious recognition of the need for this movement.
When Mal becomes trapped in the unyielding acceptance of her constructed
dream world, the only option that the film seems to offer as an alternative is the perpetual
relativism initiated by the forced disruption of reality instigated by Cobb’s inception. The
inevitability of Mal’s relativism is due to the incepted idea that the “mythic image” of
non-contingent reality is attainable. The damage elicited by Cobb’s inception of Mal is
not so much the idea that her current reality is a construct but the idea that a conscious,
objective reality exists and is attainable through death, that the mythic image can be
attained at all. In this sense, Mal’s relativist motion is inextricable from the myth
(inception) that incited it.
As Cobb and Mal walk towards the train that will return them to reality, her
constructed dream world remains intact. Although Mal accepted the (incepted) idea that
her world is not real, it would seem that the fact that her universe does not crumble as a
result of this inception helps to expose the lynchpin that separates dramatistic disruption
through delayed action and forced disruption through unconscious locomotion. The
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destruction of one’s symbolically constructed “model of the universe” must be made
evident in order to avoid the routes of foundationalism and relativism that plague Mal
after her unconscious reorientation.
Without rejecting her current orientation, Mal had merely accepted a loco-motive
of disruption and had no conscious grounding from which to justify her disruptive
reorientation. To elicit the con/version of a current orientation one must propose the
possibility (incipient attitude) of an alternate orientation. But, unlike Cobb’s use of
inception, this proposal is not enough on its own. The new orientation must be genuine
and, for Burke, a new orientation is only genuine by virtue of the fact that it is not one’s
current orientation; therefore, the new orientation is not a completely new reality with
clear barriers set up through the binary of consciousness/unconsciousness. Dramatistic
disruption resides in this moment of con/version after the incipient act of reorientation
and before the “execution” of the act of reorientation. Dramatism’s disruptive effect on
perception is not a device for arriving at a fixed, non-contingent orientation such as the
kind sought by Cobb and Mal, but is the instigation of a simultaneous acceptance and
rejection of alternate orientations.

Dramatism’s Delayed Act
Referencing Alfred Korzybski’s idea of “delayed action,” Burke defines this
concept (and thus his appropriation of it) as ranging “indeterminately over the areas of
both purely physiological movement and critical consciousness” (GM, 241). In his
description of delayed action, Burke references a moment of convergence between the
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unconscious/conscious binary in his use of the implicitly unconscious phrase “purely
physiological movement” and the explicitly conscious phrase “critical consciousness.”
Burke continues by citing how this “indeterminate” movement between
consciousness and unconsciousness establishes the terministic paradox of “delayed
action,” or the delicate balance required to vacillate between alternate orientations. He
writes, “insofar as we can reduce the concept of ‘delayed action’ to its purely
physiological moment, note that it must be the very opposite of a delay” (241). Here,
Burke notes that although this moment occurs in the context before an act, it is still an act
itself. It is “the very opposite of delay” because, despite its incipient qualities, it is the
action occurring at the present moment. Consequently, Burke is led to conclude that it is
motion which prevents the act from being completed and maintains the kind of “distance”
between the act and the incipient act which Crable claims is fundamental to Burkean
rhetoric: “the very delay of action is thus maintained by motions, since the attitude of
criticism, or delay, or ‘consciousness of abstracting’ must be maintained by its own
peculiar physiological configuration” (GM, 242). The disruptive impulse of dramatism is
necessarily elusive (and illusive) because it exists in this moment of delayed action where
the incipient-ness of an act is just as much an act as that act’s completion. It is for this
reason that I want to direct attention to delayed action in considering Burke’s continual
call for the reinforcement of an “interpretive attitude” (an incipient act) when
comprehending the symbolic contingencies of an orientation.
Wrapping up his discussion of delayed action, Burke begins to assess the
destabilizing effects elicited by the inherent incompleteness of this disruptive moment.
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He writes, “All told, the attitude or incipient act is a region of ambiguous possibilities, as
is well indicated in the Latin grammars…where ‘inceptive’ verbs are also called
‘inchoatives’ while ‘inchoate in turn means ‘beginning,’ ‘partially but not fully in
existence,’ ‘incomplete,’ and is now often used as though the writer thought it a kind of
metathesis for ‘chaotic’” (242). By revealing the requisite tension between the notion of
“beginning” and “incompleteness” embedded within the concept of attitude-as-incipientact (inception), Burke is able to reveal how this moment of “delayed action,” because it
necessarily instigates ambiguity, carries with it “chaotic” consequences. This tension
created in the moment between incipient and explicit acts necessarily entails a degree of
uncertainty because it is not only the moment in which one is uncertain of the reality that
is in the process of coming into being but it is also the moment in which one is most
uncertain of the crumbling foundations of a current reality. This paradoxical moment of
delayed action is made possible through motion which maintains the moment’s impetus
toward a complete act while at the same time keeping it within the realm of attitude.
This movement/stasis between alternate perceptions of reality reflects how the
Act-as-exclusive-motive formation is a key function of Burkean rhetoric. When an act is
no longer read simply as the manifestation of the other four terms (locus of motives) but
can be seen as a motive for itself, a degree of what could be termed the conscious
acceptance of motion is present in the act. Similar to the way that Burke describes in
Studies in Logology how “faith must ‘precede’ the rationale,” dramatism is dependent on
a conscious awareness of reorientation not an unconscious (incepted) reorientation (qtd.
in LAS, 47). The conscious, disruptive movement of dramatism elicits the instability
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necessary for comprehending one’s orientation. However, when this concept of altering a
perception of reality through movement is taken to the extreme (as seen in Inception),
this fundamental act of dramatistic reorientation shifts from conscious movement to
locomotion and thus establishes the propensity for foundationalism that exemplified in
the film’s ending.
After Cobb and his team complete their inception of Fischer and return to reality
(or so it seems), Cobb travels home where he then takes out his totem and spins it on his
dining room table. Before the audience can see what happens (if it keeps spinning he is
dreaming and if it falls he is in reality) Cobb runs off camera and the image of the
spinning top cuts away to the credits.
Much of the media buzz and popular scholarship surrounding Inception focuses
on this ambiguity in the film’s ending1. For the most part, these analyses agree that
Cobb’s decision to abandon his totem is the most important interpretive clue because it
represents his rejection for any concern for the constructed nature of his reality.
Christopher Nolan even points to this kind of interpretation in an interview where he
states that the most pivotal aspect of the film’s ending is not in whether or not the top
keeps spinning but in the significance of Cobb’s decision to abandon his totem altogether
(Schrader). Through this ending, the film offers no viable solution for managing the
bombardment of alternate realities. One must follow Cobb and settle on one reality by
abandoning the ability to gauge its verity (totem) or face the perpetual termination that
plagues Mal as a result of her refusal to accept any reality in which she finds herself.

1

See Johnson pp. 77-108.
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However, unlike the scenario represented within Inception, dramatism offers a third
route. The disruptive quality of dramatism avoids the film’s portrayal of the inevitability
of either foundationalism or relativism due to the way in which it privileges the
disruption of one’s current orientation as opposed to the unconscious movement that
results in endless reorientation or, for Mal, endless “termination”.

Between Two Realities, Between Two Entelechies
A pivotal aspect of the liminal space enacted through Burke’s dramatism is made
apparent through his use of Aristotelian entelechy. Stan A. Lindsay’s extrapolation of this
concept in Implicit Rhetoric: Kenneth Burke’s Extension of Aristotle’s Concept of
Entelechy provides one of the best introductions to how Burke’s third way exists in the
enactment between the polarizing realities of incipience and actualization. Indeed, much
of Lindsay’s research into Burke is concerned with the ways in which Burke’s thought is
tied to the term entelechy and how this exposes an emphasis on the implicitness inherent
to Burke’s conception of the fundamental nature of rhetoric. For Lindsay, Burke’s
entelechy can be defined as the “process of changing from what something is into what
something should become” (5). Through this formulation, entelechy is what works
implicitly as the motivating force behind the inevitable realization of the act and “which
allows the thing to possess internally the final form toward which the thing is changing”
(5). In this way, Crable’s privileging of distance should be considered less as a means of
departure and more as a means of arrival. Lindsay’s description of entelechy
problematizes dramatism as a “creation of distance” in the way that it emphasizes the
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simultaneous embodiment of potential realities rather than a departure from a singular
reality. There is no escaping orientation; therefore, the only way to critically assess an
orientation is to set it against another one without completely rejecting the current
orientation or accepting the next.
The film attempts to portray the possibility of a similarly dramatistic space
between two orientations in the moment when Cobb and Mal are waiting for the train that
will kill them and return them to their “real” (conscious) life. Similar to the way that
dramatism’s disruption of perception necessarily invokes the possibilities of
foundationalism and relativism, Mal’s divergent responses to the termination of her
current orientation necessarily lead to either the perpetual termination of her conscious
life (relativism) or the unquestioning acceptance of the constructed dream world in
Cobb’s psychotic projection of her (foundationalism). However, the importance of this
moment is derived from its defining characteristic as the locus before the possibility of
these divergent responses is activated. This scene works to reinforce the necessarily
impermanent and fleeting nature of this moment between an act’s “becoming”
(incomplete) and “being” (complete) that dramatism instigates.
Burke privileges the realistic possibility of a similarly liminal moment when he
writes about the tension between an invention’s state of “being” and its “state of having
become” (GM, 109). It is in this paradoxical moment prior to the culmination of “being”
towards which the “becoming” must necessarily strive that Burke claims an invention is
able to “more fully represent” human motivations. Once “externalize[d]” the invention
itself is merely a faint trace of the “internal aptitudes” that initiated the act’s becoming.
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Through this moment, and others that betray Burke’s concern with incipient-ness
(attitude), one can see that a key factor in dramatism’s disruptive act is in its ability to
establish the legitimacy of this moment between “being” and “becoming” as an act in
itself.
Burke also defines act in terms of its ability to produce something new, as a kind
of force that elicits a “motivation that cannot be explained simply in terms of the past,
being to an extent, however tiny, a new thing” (65). The necessity of action in dramatistic
reorientation is made apparent through this term’s ability to bring something “new” and,
consequently, its inherently ambiguous features that allow for a scenario similar to
Inception in which you may know “where you hope this train will take you, but you don’t
know for sure.”
Dramatism’s disruptive effects on one’s perception of reality reside in this
moment of delayed action and, unlike Inception, can be realized through an attention to
Burke’s idea of delayed action. The imagery of the barreling train that Cobb and Mal use
to extricate themselves from their constructed reality analogizes the degree of maintained
uncertainty that establishes the necessary dramatistic distance between two realities
(orientations). This scene, however, is lacking in its representation because it capitulates
to the impossibility of maintaining the stability of this moment due to the way in which
Mal’s constructed world never crumbles before her act of departure as she walks with
Cobb to the train.
In order to develop the “interpretative attitude” necessary for critical reflection on
the constructed nature of one’s reality, one must become an active participant in
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witnessing its destruction. This moment is critical because the instability it creates does
not merely expose the constructed elements of the current reality (perspective) but
simultaneously ushers in the construction of the next one. Establishing distance between
two versions of reality is a vital aspect of reorienting one’s perspective because it is the
moment that cannot be deterred; it is the moment in which a singular perception of reality
simultaneously ends (but is not yet gone) and begins (but is not yet realized).
Although dramatism may be dependent on a disruptive force to some extent, it
does not seek a disruption to the degree which Inception deems necessary. Unlike Mal,
who rejects her reality while it remains intact, dramatism seeks to disrupt one’s
perceptions only for the purposes of revealing its construction. Dramatistic disruption is
not dependent on loco-motion but rather delayed action which is not intended to initiate
the beginning of an eventual arrival at an objective reality but the present arrival of a
critical attitude (a delayed act). Although this disruption is characterized by the
movement to an unknown destination, the uncertainty that this necessarily entails must
come from a conscious apprehension of the instability of a current orientation and not
from a manufactured, unconscious, or incepted sense of this instability. Mal carried out
the motions of witnessing the destruction of her orientation without the act of destruction
ever taking place. Because Mal was denied the opportunity to consciously recognize her
false perception of reality, she was led to the kind of extreme reactions (foundationalism
and relativism) that dramatism seeks to avoid.
In looking at how Inception provides no solution to the problem it poses, one can
consider through Burke how its conception of the problem itself is faulty and thus better
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conceive of the difficulty inherent to maintaining the kind of dramatistic instability Burke
aims to instigate and how even the film itself resists this difficulty. Thus, in keeping with
Crable’s concern with the “perpetual creation of distance,” one can more effectively tease
out the difficulty inherent to a continuous, conscious reorientation of perspective.

Inception’s Illusory Borders
Although Inception has been useful in its similitude for extrapolating dramatism’s
effect on one’s perception of reality, it is just as useful in considering the ways in which it
diverges from and misrepresents dramatism’s disruptive effect on perception. When
dreamers are conscious of the moment of conversion between the dream world and
reality, their surroundings simply crumble indiscriminately without reference to the
influence from the next version of reality. Although certain scenes within the film attempt
to portray a bleeding over of this immanent reality (such as in the opening scene when
Cobb is dunked into a tub and a flood of water appears in the dream) the barrier between
the current reality and the next reality remains clear.
Burke contends that we are always dependent on our use of symbols for
comprehending the construction of our orientations. It would then seem more akin to a
dramatistic reaction if the constructed dream world merged inconspicuously with the
dreamer’s conscious reality and did not simply fall apart of its own accord. A dramatistic
representation of this moment of con/version could not portray a moment of
disintegrating reality without a concatenate moment of burgeoning reality. The train
(death) that ushers in Mal’s next reality did not effectively elicit a dramatistic
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reorientation because it was never a part of the next reality. If one’s “model of the
universe” is crumbling then another model is taking its place; and not only that, but one’s
current model can only crumble if it has begun to be replaced by another one.
The loco-motion that Inception privileges as a way to instigate the pursuit of the
mythic image of objective reality is misleading in its portrayal of a clear separation
between two different versions of reality (two different perspectives) and thus a kind of
symbol free space in which one can contemplate reality distinct from any sort of
motivational influence. As Abram Anders argues, Burke did not promote dramatistic
analysis to avoid orientation (which is unavoidable) but rather to provide a means
through which to examine the constructed influence of our orientations. He writes, “It is
necessary to emphasize Burke’s key innovation respective to pragmatism: namely, if
truth is always instrumental—an interested, useful enterprise—attempts to provide new
interpretations are never disinterested or simply attempting to better describe
reality. Another way of looking at reality is not any closer to a ‘truth’ than the last”
(Anders). Dramatism is not an orientation--free perception; it is the moment of
simultaneity, the dualistic collapse of two disparate versions of reality into a con/version
of reality.
My attention to dramatism as a con/version of reality connects to Margaret D.
Zulick’s description of Burkean entelechy which she describes as the moment when “all
prior and posterior motives are bracketed” and “the entelechial motive that wills its own
completion remains” (25). In this configuration, Zulick claims a certain inevitability of
“completion” that is separate from all other motives. Dramatistic disruption is in many

30

ways a (unconscious) “pure formal motive” because its defining characteristic is its
ability to realize the implicit motivations that spur its drive to completion, and it is during
this process of realization prior to the act’s culmination that delayed action becomes a
critical aspect for maintaining dramatism’s act of delay. Dramatism seeks to expose the
degree to which our perception of reality is created by the very terms we use to describe
it; it exposes how language motivates of its own accord and thus promulgates motives
and orientations in ways which only become apparent when that process of innate
completion is delayed.
Burke proposes that the possibility of reorientation (like any orientation) is
dependent on perspective. By way of Aristotle’s “unmoved mover,” Burke notes two
possibilities that arise when movement is abstracted and generalized to such an extent
that its characterization as movement is contingent upon its surroundings. Noting the first
of two requisite environments in which movement can occur in this configuration, Burke
writes that “the ‘motionless’ would be all that was left to serve as the dialectical
counterpart or ‘ground,’ of a concept so comprehensive” (GM, 254). The other
environment is one in which “universal motion” becomes the ground of reaction for a
“particular motion.” In either scenario, motion occurs by virtue of the fact that the same
kind of motion is not occurring either because it is motionless or because it is a different.
In this way, an act (action) is also an indication of an inverse relationship to
motionlessness (not action). Thus, it would seem that a place in which no version of
reality has taken hold is an impossibility due to Burke’s contention that the conscious
movement which instigates the exposure of symbolic construction cannot move (or at

31

least be perceived to be moving) without some kind of ground (an-other reality) from
which it can re-act.
As Crable argues, this ground of re-action for Burke is the mythic image of pure
persuasion which remains possible as a perpetual creator of distance only because it is
never actualized, or made into a “a tangible, empirical piece of the experienced world”
(221). Discussing Burke’s conception of mythic image, Crable emphasizes that the nonempirical contingency of this concept is due to its dependence on movement:

[I]f we resist the abstraction of the mythic image from the movement…we will
not mistake it for a reflection of reality-collapsing logical and temporal priority
(Rhetoric 201-203). Just as Platonic transcendence cannot be separated from its
embodiment in a dialogue, a mythic image cannot be separated from the
dialectical movement that produced it, the systematic transcendence of both ideas
and images. (222)

The mythic image is the ground for the “perpetual creation of distance.” It must
inevitably remain in this intangible realm of possibility because it is this quality of
potential reality not actual reality that makes it “mythic.” As Crable points out, Burke
argues rather succinctly in RM that “without it [interference/disruption] the appeal could
not be maintained. For if union is complete, what incentive can there be for appeal?” (qtd.
in Crable, 271). Likewise, Abram Anders claims that one of the fundamental aims of
Burkean rhetoric is contingent upon a similar degree of unknown potential when he
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writes about Burke’s disruptive technique of perspective by incongruity. Perspective by
incongruity disrupts one’s perception of language by exchanging and inverting specific
words and phrases to reveal the degree to which alternate perspectives can be generated
by language itself. Anders characterizes this concept as “the pursuit of an interval, a
slender space of possibility, discovered once we understand language as force” (emphasis
added, Anders).
For Burke, the instigation of mythic pursuit occurs within literature (hence his use
of the term dramatism). It is in the literary realm that the mythic image of a collapsed
duality between alternate orientations (the con/version of reality) is realized. In his
analysis of Burke’s oft cited chapter “Literature as Equipment for Living” from The
Philosophy of Literary Form, John McGowan claims that Burke depends upon literature
because by

altering what one can perceive and, thus, act upon, [literature] is transforming
reality itself. ‘Opening up new worlds’ to someone is no metaphor, but a precise
description of what occurs when we shift the terms and attitudes through which
the individual previously established and maintained her engagement with the
world. (142)

Bryan Crable highlights a similar dependence on literary representation when he
references Burke’s use of The Book of the Courtier in RM for capturing the mythical
moment of transcendence towards which his rhetoric perpetually strives. Describing
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Burke’s use of the book, Crable writes that it can serve as a model for the mythic image
of pure persuasion in the way that it conveys a sense of “arriving at a transformative
vision of the world, an ultimate image of oneness…which cannot be contained within
finite reason” (229).

Literature “Bridges” the Divide
In GM, near the end of his section on “Incipient and Delayed Action,” Burke
references Wordsworth’s sonnet “Composed upon Westminster Bridge” to explore its
representation of transition which he utilizes for its ability to represent a moment wherein
“the very process of transition is made motionless: for the imagery is that of a crossing,
but the crossing just is” (246). For Burke, the dramatistic tension of delayed action
required to contemplate the symbolic construction of reality is realized through a literary
representation where the mythical simultaneity of stasis and movement is holistically
exemplified. Burke’s decision in neglecting a detailed analysis of this poem reflects the
point he wishes to establish about literature’s utility as a representation in which a poem
itself can both convey (move) and remain “by reason of its summarizing nature” (246).
To set up clearly its connections to Inception, I would like to quote Burke’s description of
the Wordsworth’s poem at some length:

It is not the incipience of the internal debate, arrested at the moment of indecision
prior to a decision from which grievous consequences are inevitably to follow.
Nor is it a retrospective summary. It just is, a state of mind that has come to rest
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by reason of its summarizing nature. It encompasses. We are concerned not with
its potentialities, but with it as an end in itself. It has conveyed a moment of stasis
(we are aware of the pun at the roots of this expression). It envisions such rest as
might be a ground, a beginning and end, of all action (Burke’s emphasis, GM,
246).

Here, Burke appears resolute in his discovery of a representative state of delayed action
that is “not concerned with its potentialities” but “as an end in itself.” Unlike the kind of
complete action that Burke says requires a ground of non-movement (an-other
movement, an-other orientation) in order to be perceived, the delayed action in this poem
is not contingent on its movement from something because it has paradoxically “conveyed
a moment of stasis.” It is through the representation of this moment between two
conflicting perceptions (movement and stasis) that the paradox of delayed action is
“conveyed.”
Burke’s dependency on literary representation begs a multitude of questions: is
literature for Burke merely an illustration or is it more like the transitory permanence of
Wordsworth’s position on the bridge, “an end in itself?” Is this moment of con/version
locked within the imagery of poetic (or filmic) representation from which we can only
catch a glimpse?
In his attention to literature, I believe that Burke is enacting something similar to
what James L. Kastely describes in his analysis of Plato’s Gorgias. Kastely’s essential
claim is that Plato’s disparaging representation of rhetoric in Gorgias functions as an
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attempt to foreground the importance of rhetoric’s relationship to philosophy through its
ability to create “dialectical refutation” (106). For Kastely, this provocation of dialectical
refutation is accomplished due to the unsatisfactory dialectic that unfolds between
Socrates (Philosophy) and Gorgias (Rhetoric). Similar to the way in which Burke's use of
Wordsworth captures the paradox of stasis/movement, Kastely argues that Socrates
liminal stance at the end of Gorgias remains unresolved through his “refusal to claim that
his position is true and by his maintaining only that he has not yet been refuted” (97). By
leaving the argument unresolved, Kastely argues that Plato’s Gorgias instigates the
necessary attention to rhetoric required to maintain the suitable dialectical structure of
philosophical inquiry. The dialogue is meant to provide an unsatisfactory characterization
of the role of rhetoric within dialectic and philosophy so as to prompt further exploration
from the audience.
Likewise, I would argue that Inception is vital for not merely illustrating the
complexities of Burke’s thought but for instigating an unsatisfactory sense of
reorientation that is so crucial to dramatism’s effect on perceptions of reality. Burke
considers the motivations and desires that occur within literature (drama) inseparable
from the same kinds of motivations and desires that occur within our perception of
“reality.” Literature is effective in instigating the con/version of that Burke seeks to
expose as the primary misconception concerning our orientations.
Burke’s dependence upon the Wordsworth poem seems to argue that literature
can provide a means for not simply subverting expectations but of realizing the
ambiguities that literature (re)presents as a possibility. He is exposing in this moment
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how the disruptive impetus of dramatism and, most importantly, his use of (and our use
of) language functions in the same manner as it does in literature. Literature for Burke is
a moment of action which seeks to move the reader in the same way that we are moved
by the symbolic action of other uses of language. Dramatism is the inducing of a critical
attitude initiated by the “slender space of possibility” neglected in our inattention to
language yet made apparent through our attention to it within literature (Anders).
Inception does not represent the kind of achieved transcendence (arrival of mythic
image) that Burke establishes through Wordsworth but rather the harsh consequences of
seeking to attain a non-contingent, objective reality such as the kind sought by Mal.
Although the film attempts to deny a definitive arrival at an objective, conscious reality,
the way in which it structures the binary between conscious and unconscious worlds
reinforces the myth that reality exists in the perpetual conversion to the next reality, that
the only way to alter one’s reality is through an unconscious conversion which will lead
to either perpetual termination or foundationalist denial. Contrary to the way that
Inception privileges the desired attainment of a mythic, objective reality, Burke’s literary
emphasis within dramatism reveals that the mythic image must remain in the realm of
possibility in order for it not to be translated into the foundationalist retreat into one
particular “model of the universe.”
In contrast to the bridge metaphor that Burke discovers via Wordsworth, I believe
Inception brings something new to the conversation concerning dramatistic disruption of
reality in the way that it emphasizes the inability of unconscious motion (loco-motion) to
adequately instigate a moment of delayed action between two perceptions of reality. As
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Inception reveals, an effective dramatistic disruption of reality requires the simultaneous
initiation and delay of reorientation. If Mal truly accepted Cobb’s inception then why did
she fear the train? She did not consciously initiate her reorientation but merely inhabited
the relativistic fear enacted by her unconscious acquiescence to it.
Dramatism, although certainly elusive, unstable, and contentious is nevertheless a
perspective that Burke believed adoptable. It is a disruption that forces us to recognize
the constructed contingencies of our perceptions without sliding into the perpetual
termination of relativism or the “hysterical retreat” to foundationalism. To follow Burke
is to acknowledge the inability of completely terminating one’s orientational
contingency. Dramatism does not seek the complete removal from any “model of the
universe;” it merely seeks to distort one’s belief in their unwavering stability.
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